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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the impact of business incentives on the 
technical efficiency of Italian manufacturing firms. Using DEA al-
lows a novel treatment of the omitted-variable and sample-selec-
tion  bias.  Through  DEA  one  carries  out  direct  comparisons 
between similar observations akin to those carried out in non-para-
metric  matching  analysis.  The selection  bias can be treated by 
conditioning these comparisons on the variables ruling the distri-
bution of state aid. We separately utilise four Capitalia surveys, in 
order to test whether policy effectiveness has changed during the 
1990s. Moreover we consider separately the effects of the three 
main kinds of state aid to manufacturing (soft loans, grants, and 
tax rebates). The results indicate that state aid had a negative im-
pact on technical efficiency. However, this impact mostly relates to  
soft loans, and looses significance in the late 1990s.
Keywords
Business incentives, Policy evaluation, Technical efficiency, DEA.
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1. Introduction1
State  support  for  business  in  Italy  has  been  traditionally 
centred on financial incentives. Recent years however have also 
witnessed a growth in fiscal incentives for investment and R&D. In 
spite of these institutional changes and the policy importance of 
the subject (suffice it  to say that 70% of the National  Operative 
Programme 2000-2006 has been allotted for business incentives 
to small and medium enterprises), impact evaluation has been far 
less abundant here than in the field of labour market policies. 
As  is  well  emphasised  in  the  surveys  of  Heckman  et  al. 
(1999) and of Blundell and Costa-Dias (2000), the crucial element 
in impact evaluation is the specification of the counterfactual hypo-
thesis, that is what would have been done by subsidised firms in 
the absence of intervention. The fundamental problems in this re-
spect are the omitted variable bias (linked to the difficulty of meas-
uring the effects of intervention separately from other factors) and 
the selection bias (linked to the fact that subsidised firms are se-
lected not randomly but on the basis of some criteria, and can then 
have some characteristics that impair their comparison with non-
subsidised firms). The solution to these problems requires, beside 
the adoption of appropriate empirical procedures (not always util-
ised in the existing studies), the utilisation of data-sets containing 
1 Skilful research assistance by Giuseppe Lubrano Lavadera is gratefully acknow-
ledged.
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sufficiently rich information on firm characteristics. In this respect 
the surveys  promoted by Capitalia  (formerly Mediocredito  Cent-
rale) are of particular interest because they contain, especially for 
small  and  medium  firms,  information  not  otherwise  available  in 
Italian data-bases.
In order to better understand how these data can be utilised 
to improve the empirical evidence that already exists in Italy, it is 
useful to briefly reappraise the main justifications of these policy in-
terventions, as well as their potential problems (Carlucci and Pel-
legrini,  2001). The motivation of public intervention relies on two 
different types of market failure. In the first case, some types of 
market imperfection (particularly in the credit and capital markets) 
prevent a correct assessment of economic projects and imply an 
unduly low level of investment. In the second case, the existence 
of  non-appropriable  externalities  in  investment,  R&D,  or  similar 
projects requires public intervention in favour of these activities. In 
both cases, state aid can incur problems of low net impact (one 
can subsidise projects that would have been carried out by firms 
even in the absence of business incentives) and of efficiency (if 
there are market imperfections, one could erroneously subsidise 
projects that the market would have correctly rejected; in the case 
of externalities the increase in social efficiency could be lower than 
the decrease in private efficiency).
The production of (correct) empirical evidence on the net im-
pact  of  a policy  follows  naturally from the solution of  the afore-
mentioned problems of  specifying the counterfactual hypothesis. 
On the other  hand,  a  correct  appraisal  of  the  efficiency  effects 
probably requires a more innovative research effort,  centring on 
the computation and utilisation of performance measures based on 
the so-called frontier analysis of efficiency (see for instance Fried 
et al., 1993; Cooper et al., 2000). Indeed, a typical feature of the 
existing Italian evidence is that positive effects of financial incent-
ives on investments (and employment) are accompanied by insig-
nificant (or even negative) effects on firm profitability, as measured 
by balance-sheet indicators (typically the ROI). Yet, such results 
are consistent with rather different scenarios as far as private and 
social efficiency are concerned. They could follow from (i) a rise in 
capital per worker in the presence of decreasing marginal product, 
without any significant impact on technical progress or efficiency; 
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(ii) a rise in capital per worker accompanied not only by technical 
progress embodied in the new capital goods, but also by a reduc-
tion of technical and/or allocative efficiency.
In either case it is fundamentally important to be able to eval-
uate separately the changes in the potential determinants of profit-
ability  (capital-deepening,  technical  progress,  variations  in  effi-
ciency), as well as to assess their sources. In fact the distinction 
between the concepts of technical and allocative efficiency (see on 
this the works gathered in Fried et al.,  1993, or the discussions 
contained  in  Mazzotta,  1999;  Destefanis,  2000)  not  only  allows 
some conclusions on the outcome of state aid, but also the de-
tailed analysis of its consequences for firm behaviour.
The present paper aims to use the data from the Capitalia 
surveys to evaluate the empirical validity of these considerations. 
Its three key features are (i) the utilisation of non-parametric ana-
lysis (DEA) in measuring the technical efficiency of firms, which ar-
guably allows a novel treatment of the problems of omitted variable 
and selection bias, (ii) the utilisation of all four waves of the Cap-
italia database, (iii) the care devoted to assess the impact of vari-
ous kinds of financial (soft loans, grants) and fiscal incentives. The 
rest of the paper is organised as follows: in the second section we 
present the institutional framework, in the third section we evaluate 
the literature, in the fourth section we illustrate the empirical ap-
proach, in the fifth section we present  and assess strength and 
weaknesses of our database, in the sixth section we describe the 
empirical set-up, as well as the main results. The seventh section 
concludes.
2. Business incentives in Italy. The institutional framework
The case of Italy is particularly interesting for the analysis of 
business incentives.  Especially since the inception of the Cassa 
per il Mezzogiorno2 in the second post-war period, various kinds of 
2 The Mezzogiorno area includes the following regions: Abruzzo, Molise, Cam-
pania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna. Recent descriptive evid-
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incentives have been implemented, with an emphasis on financial 
incentives. This variety also relates to the duration of incentives 
(short-tem, long-term or permanent) and to the targeted variables 
(employment,  investment,  R&D  or,  more  generally,  innovation). 
There are three main kinds of business incentives in Italian manu-
facturing: interest rate subsidies, capital grants and tax credits (or 
rebates).  The latter begun to matter seriously only from 1995 on-
wards. In our empirical analysis we will deal with the following sub-
sidies.
The Sabatini Act, granting interest rate subsidies for the pur-
chase of capital goods. The regions, according to current regula-
tions, can also provide to firms a capital grant (the so-called "new 
Sabatini Act"). This act is of particular interest inasmuch as it is of-
ten held responsible (alongside the Act 64/1986, now abrogated, 
but documented in the questionnaires) for the overcapitalisation of 
small and medium firms, especially in the Mezzogiorno (Prosper-
etti and Varetto, 1991; Giannola and Del Monte, 1997).
The Act 488/1992, providing capital grants as incentives to 
investment programmes in depressed areas. The interest of this 
act is clear, as it has recently represented in Italy the main policy 
instrument  in  favour  of  investments  (Ministero  dell'Industria, 
2000a).
The Act 317/1991, through which firms can choose between 
a tax reduction and a capital grant in order to finance investment 
expenditures. The incentive conditions are particularly favourable 
for firms of smaller size or situated in depressed areas.
Elements of particular interest both in the 488/1992 and in 
the 317/1991 Acts are that they have been proclaimed and imple-
mented throughout the period covered by the Capitalia Surveys. 
This makes it possible in principle to compare the behaviour of a 
subset of firms before and after the subsidy.
The Act 46/1982, awarding subsidised loans or interest rate 
subsidies to firms carrying out R&D programmes. This act is the 
main policy instrument in favour of R&D expenditures in Italy.
Most of these subsidies are restricted to small-medium firms, 
some to Southern firms. The subsidy provision generally depends 
on area and size, sometimes also on the existence of a consorti-
ence  about  these  regions  can  be  found  in  D'Acunto  et  al.  (2004)  and  in 
Destefanis et al. (2004).
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um. The Act 488/1992 (implemented in 1994) possibly represents 
a discontinuity, in as much as subsidies were granted after a care-
ful scrutiny of the perspective project.
3. Evaluating business incentives. The state of the art
As  already  said,  business  incentives  rely  on  two  different 
types of market failure. Some types of market imperfection (partic-
ularly in the credit and capital markets) may prevent a correct as-
sessment of economic projects and imply an unduly low level of in-
vestment. Otherwise, the existence of non-appropriable externalit-
ies in investment, R&D, or similar projects requires public interven-
tion in favour of these activities.3 In any case, incentives can incur 
problems of low net impact and of efficiency.  In this section we 
want to illustrate the existing Italian evidence on these points.
A first group of studies focuses on Act 44 (investment sub-
sidies for young entrepreneurs). Mazzotta (1999) appraises Act 44 
through a stochastic frontier analysis on a sample of manufactur-
ing firms.  She finds that  subsidised firms are less efficient  than 
non-subsidised ones. However, differences are not very significant 
within  traditional  manufacturing.  Battistin  et  al.  (2001),  testing a 
learning-by-doing  model,  find  that  the  efficiency  (measured  in 
terms of survival through a duration analysis) of subsidised firms 
increases only as long they are receiving aid. Bondonio and Mar-
tini (2001) evaluate the impact of investment subsidies for young 
entrepreneurs through an event history analysis. They find that the 
young age of the entrepreneur has a strongly negative impact on 
firm survival. However, subsidised firms tend to survive more than 
non-subsidised ones. Also Del Monte and Scalera (2001) measure 
efficiency in terms of survival. However, they relate differences in 
this variable to the kind of finance provided to firms, either private 
or subsidised. Applying a maximum likelihood technique they ob-
3 Recent  evidence  about  the  existence  of  these  market  failures  in  the 
Mezzogiorno is discussed  in Biagioli  et al. (1999) and in Destefanis and Sena 
(2005).
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tain two main results: no difference between the two classes of fin-
ance, but a greater risk failure for larger investment projects.
Another group of studies refers to the state support for firms 
in the Mezzogiorno and other depressed areas, focusing on the 
employment impact of  the  Act 488/1992 (Pellegrini,  1999; Minis-
tero  dell’Industria,  2000a;  Carlucci  and  Pellegrini,  2003).  These 
studies  find that this Act had a positive and significant impact on 
employment.  On the other hand,  Bondonio (2002) finds that the 
employment  impact  of  state  support  in  depressed  areas  of  the 
North has been rather weak.  A related group of studies concerns 
itself more generally with the effects of various types of incentives 
on  the  real  and  financial  characteristics  of  firms  (Lodde  et  al., 
1993; Bagella and Becchetti, 1998; Bagella et al., 2004). A typical 
result appearing throughout several of these studies is that positive 
effects  of  financial  incentives  on investments (and employment) 
are accompanied by insignificant (or even negative) effects on firm 
profitability,  typically  measured  by  balance-sheet  indicators.  In 
Ministero dell’Industria (2000b) the effects of R&D incentives are 
considered, finding a positive impact of state aid on capital accu-
mulation and productivity, but not on sales.
Bagella et al. (2004) is perhaps the study most akin to the 
present work. They analyse over three Capitalia surveys (5th,  6th 
and 7th) the probability of being subsidised, and estimate, condi-
tional to that probability, the impact of investment subsidies. They 
find that this impact gathers strength over time, also because of 
the introduction of the Act 488/1992 with its new eligibility criteria. 
Finally they apply a stochastic frontier analysis (imposing constant 
returns to scale) to data from the 7th survey only, finding that soft 
loans push firms away from the frontier while export subsidies af-
fect technical efficiency positively.
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4.The evaluation of business incentives through DEA
On of the key features of the present paper is the utilisation 
of DEA, a non-parametric frontier technique (Cooper et al., 2000). 
In our opinion, non-parametric frontier analysis has significant ana-
logies  with  the  procedures  of  non-parametric  matching  that  re-
cently have aroused much interest in the policy evaluation literat-
ure (Martini et al., 2003). Below, we shall shortly describe the main 
tenets of DEA. This description will also show how the adoption of 
non-parametric frontier analysis is potentially conducive to the pro-
duction of qualitatively novel empirical  evidence on business in-
centives.
Non-parametric frontier methods require an extremely limited 
number of hypotheses on production. The technical efficiency of a 
producer is assessed on the basis of a production set constructed 
by  applying  linear  programming  techniques.  No  hypothesis  is 
made on the existence of a functional relation between inputs and 
outputs. In DEA, the reference frontier is identified by constructing 
a convex envelope around the production set,  using  linear  pro-
gramming procedures incorporating the hypotheses of free input- 
and output-disposal and convexity.4 In Figure 4.1 we provide some 
examples  of  DEA  frontiers  obtained  respectively  under  the  as-
sumptions of constant returns (DEA-CRS), non-increasing returns 
(DEA-NIRS) and variable returns (DEA-VRS) to scale.
Figure 4.1 – Some DEA Production Frontiers
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4    The hypothesis of convexity is however far from harmless. A critical evaluation 
of it can be found in Destefanis and Storti (2002).
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In order to compute the technical inefficiency of the observations, 
we must decide about the metrics (radial, additive, …) and the ori-
entation (input, output) of measurement. Usually, a radial metrics 
(Farrell, 1957) is taken. Then, supposing with no loss of generality 
that  efficiency  scores  are  output-oriented,  technical  efficiency  is 
equal to the radial expansion required by the output of an ineffi-
cient unit in order to reach the frontier. A technically efficient obser-
vation (and which therefore stands on the reference frontier) will 
naturally obtain an efficiency score equal to one.
Beside the advantage of making no hypothesis on the func-
tional  form of  the input-output  relationship,  non-parametric tech-
niques do not suffer from endogeneity bias. The same frontier is 
singled out, irrespectively of the input- or output-orientation of the 
analysis.  Furthermore,  it  is  not true,  as is  still  commonly  main-
tained, that statistical inference cannot be carried out within DEA 
(Banker, 1996). Subsequently, inferential statements can be made 
about the returns-to-scale assumptions, the inputs and outputs ex-
cluded from the production set, or (for instance) the impact on effi-
ciency of business incentives.
What  is  however  true  is  that  stochastic  noise  cannot  be 
straightforwardly modelled within non-parametric methods. A con-
sequence of this is that DEA is very sensitive to the presence of 
outliers. The latter are particularly relevant if they are situated on 
the frontier of the production set. In order to ascertain their exist-
ence, we compute for all efficient observations the so-called super-
efficiency scores – indicating the maximum radial contraction con-
sistent  with  the observation remaining efficient  (see Figure 4.2). 
Super-efficiency scores greater than 2.5-3 are likely to be associ-
ated with an outlier. In this case one must decide whether the effi-
ciency scores must be recalculated excluding such an observation 
from the production set. In taking this decision it is useful to con-
sider Tørgensen’ rho (Tørgersen et al., 1996) which measures the 
importance of a reference unit for the efficiency potential of the in-
efficient units. A high (>0.10-0.15) value of the rho indicates that 
an efficient observation is important as a benchmark for other ob-
servations.  Hence a combination of  high super-efficiency scores 
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and rho’s singles out outliers that should be excluded from the pro-
duction set.
Figure 4.2 – Evaluating Super-efficiency 
But why could DEA be a novel solution to the problems of 
omitted variable and selection bias? DEA puts on the production 
frontier some existing producers and carries out  direct comparis-
ons between their  convex combinations and the producers they 
dominate. These comparisons include producers with similar input-
output mixes, and are closely related to the evaluation techniques 
based on non-parametric matching. In a sense, DEA successfully 
faces what is called the problem of common support in the non-
parametric matching literature (see Figures 4.3.a-b).
12
          y
                                    O
                                            o
                                                               o
                                o
o
o
                                                                               x
Figure 4.3.a – Policy Evaluation: The Regression Framework (a) 
Figure 4.3.b – Policy Evaluation: The Regression Framework (b)
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Consider Figure 4.3.a. An estimate of the policy effect can 
only be obtained by extrapolating the regression line (supported by 
non-treated units) close to the treated units. This policy estimates 
are highly dependent, among other things, on assumptions about 
functional form. In Figure 4.3.b, on the other hand, comparisons 
between treated and non-treated units can be made for similar val-
ues of the conditioning variables. In non-parametric matching such 
a comparison (for similar  values of the conditioning variables) is 
made by construction.  In DEA all  observations are always com-
pared with linear combinations of other actual observations (see 
Figure 4.4). This means that all observations, either treated or non-
treated, are compared with units with a similar input-output mix.
Figure 4.4 – Policy Evaluation: A DEA General Framework
The scope for common support in DEA can be increased by 
restricting  comparison to  categories  of  similar  observations  (by 
size, area, …). See for instance Figure 4.5. If these categories are 
relevant  for  the  provision  of  business  incentives,  this  restricted 
comparison can also be reinterpreted as a procedure correcting for 
the selection bias in the evaluation of state aid.
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Figure 4.5 – Policy Evaluation: A DEA Restricted Framework
DEA can accommodate the variables relevant for the provi-
sion  of  business  incentives  as  non-discretionary  (fixed)  inputs 
(Banker and Morey, 1986). Efficiency scores are calculated in the 
direction  of  other inputs and outputs,  comparing  only  producers 
within a given category of non-discretionary inputs. Obviously this 
is valid solution to the selection bias only if we can observe (and 
included in the analysis) all the variables relevant for the provision 
of business incentives.
5. The Capitalia database
We now turn  to  the  description  of  the  Capitalia  database, 
some features of which are decisive in shaping up the structure of 
our empirical exercise. We will deal first with the database in gen-
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eral; then we will take a closer look to the treatment of business in-
centives in it.
The database structure
Our data refer to the four more recent Capitalia surveys (5th 
to 8th) going from 1989 to 2000. The 5th survey covers the 1989-
1991 years, the 6th goes from 1992 to 1994, the 7th from 1995 to 
1997 and the 8th from 1998 to 2000. The Capitalia surveys con-
sider an open panel of Italian manufacturing firms, with about 4500 
firms for each survey. Besides balance sheet data, they provide 
qualitative  information ranging from general  aspects (year  when 
the firm was founded, legal form, reorganisations, ownership and 
control, groups and consortia) to workforce qualifications and train-
ing; from investment and R&D to firm’s finance and financial and 
fiscal incentives.5 Most of this qualitative information relates to the 
three-year period as a whole.  Only a few of it  (for instance the 
number of white-collar and blue-collar employees) is available for 
each  year.  The  balance  sheet  information  includes  most  items 
from the firms’ balance sheets for all the three years.
The firms included in the surveys were selected by means of 
a mixed procedure: sample-based for firms with between 11 and 
500 employees, and exhaustive for firms with more than 500 em-
ployees. The composition of the sample was determined by means 
of a random selection procedure stratified by class of employees, 
area and sector. A supplementary list of about 8000 firms was con-
structed for each survey, in order to integrate by stratum the firms 
that had failed to reply.
It is useful to consider in Table A.1 the consequences of this 
sampling  procedure  on the composition  of  the panel  over  time. 
There are only  163 firms surviving  throughout  the four surveys. 
The number  of  surviving  firms is  always  considerably  higher  in 
contiguous surveys.6 Analysing the surveys in details (see Nese 
and O’Higgins, 2005) reveals that this attrition is far from having a 
random nature. Hence, a panel-like use of these surveys is rather 
problematic.  In  the  empirical  analysis  we  will  take each  survey 
5 There are about 200 questions in the 4th and 5th survey, while the 8th survey 
contains 400 questions.
6 The rather low rate of survival between the 6th and the 7th survey could partially 
depend from the lack of a common firm code between these surveys.
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separately, and try to control for the presence of an attrition bias in 
our results.
Business incentives in the Capitalia database
Information on business incentives is available in the Cap-
italia database in two different ways. There is a point in the ques-
tionnaire asking firms (i) whether they have received any kind of 
business incentive, and (ii) under which Act is the incentive given. 
A second source of information derives from the points relating to 
investments  and  R&D expenditures.  Here  firms  are  also  asked 
how they finance these projects. Among the different forms of fin-
ance they can indicate soft loans, grants, or tax rebates. 
The first source of information separates firms that received 
some  aid  from  firms  who  did  not.  Almost  44% of  firms  in  the 
sample received some kind of business incentive (see Figure A.1). 
This source has two drawbacks. There is no information either on 
the kind of project being financed or on the amount received. Fur-
thermore, the sample coverage of the point relating to the single 
Acts is not very satisfactory. We subsequently turn to the second 
source of information. 
In the points of the questionnaire relating to investments and 
R&D expenditures, firms are asked to describe the kind of finance 
utilised. In the 5th and 6th surveys they give purely qualitative in-
formation.  Only  in  the two following  surveys  the firm is  actually 
asked to specify the quota of a given kind of finance over the total 
project. In all the four surveys we find soft loans and grants among 
these categories, while tax rebates cannot be found in the 5th sur-
vey. However, in that period this kind of business incentive was vir-
tually non-existent in Italian manufacturing. 
About 38% of firms in the sample received some kind of state 
support to investment or R&D. Examining the data we realised that 
a non-negligible share of firms reported a state-aided project share 
smaller  than  10%.  We  decided  not  to  consider  as  state-aided 
those firms. Under this restricted definition state aid was distrib-
uted to only 31% of  firms.  Some firms obtained more than one 
form of aid, but, as shown in Figure A.1, overlappings are not very 
large (26% receive one kind of aid, 5% two kinds, and not even 
0.1% three kinds). As shown in Table A.2, soft loans are the most 
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common form of state aid: it was given to 18% of firms, while 10% 
obtained a grant, and 8% a tax rebate.
6. The empirical analysis
Given the  structure of  the  Capitalia  database,  we  analyse 
every wave on its own. Actually we consider data for the last year 
of each survey: 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000. In order to reduce 
the  scope  for  unobserved  heterogeneity,  we  compute  the  effi-
ciency scores by considering separately firm-level data for 12 in-
dustries (ranked alphabetically in Table 6.1). A finer level of disag-
gregation was not permitted by considerations of sample size.
Table 6.1 – The Industries under Scrutiny
We separate state-aided from non state-aided firms, and we 
also analyse separately the effects of soft loans, grants and tax re-
bates. The analytical set-up presented in Section 4 suggests the 
specification of an extended production set, including outputs, in-
puts  and a set  of  control  variables  relevant  for  the provision of 
business incentives.
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INDUSTRIES 
Apparel & Leather 
Chemicals & Rubber 
Electrical machinery 
Fabricated Metal Products 
Food 
Means of Transport 
Metal Products 
Non-electrical Machinery 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 
Other Industries 
Paper & Printing 
Textiles 
 
Table 6.2 – The Production Set
OUTPUT:
Sales
INPUTS:
Intermediate inputs
Capital: gross fixed capital stock at book value
Labour: number of blue collars; number of white collars
CONTROL VARIABLES:
Area (South or non-South)
Consortium (belonging or not)
Size (three categories:  up to 50, 51-100, more than 100 employees, 
all taken in the first year of the wave)
Some of the control variables (especially size) are related to 
the  changing  nature  of  the  samples  (see  Nese  and  O’Higgins, 
2005). Hence, by including them in our production set, we control 
to some extent for the presence of an attrition bias in our results. 
We do not impose constant returns to scale, and calculate both in-
put- and output-oriented efficiency scores.
We obtain DEA efficiency scores with quite high mean and 
low variance, even without the controls (see Table A.2). They com-
pare favourably with results from a production set with value ad-
ded, labour and capital (not shown here). 
In broad agreement with a priori expectations, business in-
centives have a slight unfavourable impact on technical efficiency 
(see Table A.3). However, this is  mostly true for soft loans. Also, 
this negative impact weakens over time (see Table A.4).
There is no clear cross-industry pattern (see Table A.5).
7.Concluding remarks
In this paper we have focused on the impact of business in-
centives on the technical efficiency of manufacturing firms. A dis-
19
tinctive feature of our work is that we have adopted DEA as a tool 
capable of dealing with the well-known problems of omitted-vari-
able and selection bias. We used the Capitalia database, focusing 
separately on its four more recent surveys (5th to 8th). This means 
that, at least for the time being, we have not been able to ascertain 
the dynamic influence of business incentives (say over a three-to-
six year time span).
In broad agreement with a priori expectations, business in-
centives have a slight unfavourable impact on technical efficiency. 
However,  this  negative  impact  weakens  over  time.  There  is  no 
clear cross-industry pattern. On the other hand,  the negative im-
pact on technical efficiency mostly relates to soft loans.
In future work we want to extend the set of the variables rel-
evant for the provision of subsidies. The variables most immedi-
ately coming to mind in this respect are binary indicators for the 
exporting nature of the firm, and indicators of the financial stance 
of the firm, such as the debt-to-asset ratio. In order to assess more 
fully the impact of business incentives, we can also analyse their 
influence on allocative efficiency. Indeed, there is some evidence 
(see Table A.6)  that state aid has some impact on the shadow 
prices of inputs (especially those of capital stock and, to a lesser 
extent, of labour). Through DEA one can compare these shadow 
prices to the actual market prices of inputs, obtaining a measure of 
allocative efficiency (see Figure 7.1).
In the Capitalia database it is rather easy to obtain market 
prices for the capital stock and for aggregate labour. In order to 
find prices for white- and blue-collars, it is however necessary to 
use information from other data-sets (possibly based on the INPS 
archive). Also prices of the intermediate inputs can be computed 
using some outside information, which in this case can probably be 
obtained only at the industry level.
20
Figure 7.1 – Measuring Allocative Efficiency through DEA
Finally, we also intend to explore in the future the possibility 
to deal more explicitly with the presence of an attrition bias in the 
Capitalia database, carrying out a dynamic analysis of business in-
centives.
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Figure A.2 - Some Descriptive Evidence on Business Incentives #2
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Table A.1 Number of Firms in the Various Surveys
5th
survey
6th
survey
7th
survey
8th
survey
5th survey 4156
6th survey 2571 5415
7th survey 544 927 4497
8th survey 163 257 1312 4680
Table A.2 - The DEA Efficiency Scores: Means
Table A.3 - The Incentives: A Bird’s Eye View
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Industries  
 
Inp. -Or.  Outp. -Or.  
Apparel & Leather  0.90  0.90  
Chemicals & Rubber  0.85  0.83  
Electrical machinery  0.85  0.84  
Fabr. Metal Products  0.87  0.86  
Food  0.89  0.88  
Means of Transport  0.94  0.93  
Metal Products  0.92  0.92  
Non-electr. Machinery  0.82  0.81 
Non-met. Min. Products  0.90  0.89  
Other Industries  0.94  0.93  
Paper & Printing  0.89  0.88  
Textiles  0.88  0.88  
 
TREATMENT YES NO 
 
 
 MEDIAN TE K-W TEST 
(P-Value) 
    
Any BI .89 .92 .00 
Loan .89 .91 .00 
Grant .90 .91 .46 
Tax .90 .91 .58 
 
 
Table A.4 - The Incentives: Evolution through Time
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TREATMENT  YES NO  
 MEDIAN TE  K-W TEST  
(P-Value)  
Any BI    
1991 .87 .91 .00 
1994 .89 .92 .00 
1997 .91 .94 .00 
2000 .90 .92 .01 
  
   
Loan   
1991 .87 .89 .00 
1994 .89 .91 .03 
1997 .92 .94 .12 
2000 .90 .91 .25 
    
Grant   
1991 .87 .89 .23 
1994 .90 .90 .81 
1997 .93 .93 .84 
2000 .91 .91 .42 
    
Tax   
1991 na na na 
1994 .86 .90 .02 
1997 .90 .94 .00 
2000 .91 .91 .65 
 
Table A.5 - The Incentives: The Industry View
Table A.6 - A Look at the Input Mix
w (capital 
stock)
w (white-col-
lars)
w (blue-col-
lars)
w (intermedi-
ate inputs)
No BI 0.000017 0.006650 0.003375 0.000075
Any BI 0.000005 0.003665 0.001407 0.000052
All 
Obs. 0.000009 0.004929 0.002181 0.000062
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Industries (Any BI) YES NO 
Apparel & Leather 0.94 0.94 
Chemicals & Rubber 0.85 0.91 
Electrical machinery 0.88 0.90 
Fabr. Metal Products 0.89 0.89 
Food 0.92 0.95 
Means of Transport 1.00 1.00 
Metal Products 0.98 0.98 
Non-electr. Machinery 0.82 0.86 
Non-met. Min. Products 0.91 0.94 
Other Industries 0.97 0.98 
Paper & Printing 0.90 0.93 
Textiles 0.89 0.94 
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